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1.  Introduction 
It has been argued by various authors that there is no general correspondence between 
focus and new information, and background and old information, respectively (cf. e.g. 
Rochemont 1986, Schwarzschild 1999). On the other hand, with respect to noun phrases 
there  are  results  indicating  that  (de)accenting  does  have  an  influence  on  the  NP's 
reference. Bosch (1988), for example, points out the role of markedness in noun phrase 
interpretation.  Van  Deemter  (1994)  discusses  the  role  of  accenting  to  indicate  a 
subsectional  anaphor.  Jiiger  (1998)  shows  that  weak  quantifiers  are  interpreted 
existentially or as partitives depending on the type and the position of the accent. Krifka 
(1999) argues for a class of  "non-novel"  indefinites, which presuppose their discourse 
referents and have to be deaccented. 
Consider  the  definite  the  shed  in  (1). Depending on  whether  it  is  accented, the 
interpretation of the noun phrase is radically different. With an accent on shed we will 
conclude that there is exactly one shed belonging to John's cottage. Without the accent, 
on the other hand, we have to interpret the shed as referring  to the cottage itself, the 
speaker obviously making a disapproving comment. With the accent on the descriptive 
content the definite refers to an  object distinct from John's cottage thus introducing a 
novel discourse referent. Without an accent, the definite is identified with a previously 
given discourse referent. 
(1)  (John has an old cottage.) 
a.  Last summer he reconstructed the SHED. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed 
This paper focuses on definite descriptions. It will be shown that a definite description 
refers to a given discourse referent if the descriptive content is completely deaccented. 
But if  there is a focussed element within  the descriptive content it introduces a novel 
referent.  This  amounts  to  allowing  two  readings  for  definite  descriptions  without, 
however, allowing two readings for the definite article. 
This  approach  is,  of  course,  based  on  a  uniqueness  view  on  definiteness.  In 
particular, I will employ the account in Farkas (2000) and (2001, in this volume). Farkas 
presents a notion of uniqueness subsuming familiarity: Definites have to be "no-choice" 
either by being identical to a given referent or by means of their description. According 
to  Farkas  proper  names  and  pronouns  contribute  an  identifying  condition  whereas 
definite descriptions have to be determined by their descriptive content. Farkas argues 
that this difference in interpretation accounts for the different positions of proper names 
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definiteness hierarchy discussed in the functional literature: 
Definiteness hierarchy:' 
personal pronounlproper name > definite description > specific indefinite > non-specific indefinite 
I will  follow Farkas with  respect  to  interpreting  definites  as being  "no-choice"  NPs 
either via identity to another referent or via description. I will, however, argue that her 
account of definite descriptions is too coarse grained. Taking the difference induced by 
accenting  into  account  a  shift  in  the  division  between  identifying  definites  and 
description  based  definites  into  the  region  of  definites  descriptions  suggests  itself: 
Deaccented definite descriptions referring to a given referent achieve uniqueness via an 
identity  condition, but  if  there  is  an  accent  on  the  descriptive  content,  the  definite 
achieves  uniqueness  by  making  use  of  its  description,  thus  establishing  a  novel 
discourse referent. 
pronounlproper name > given DD  > nnn-given DD  > specific indefinit > non-specific indefinit 
(identifying,  (description based, 
deaccented)  accented) 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  In  the  next  section  I  will  briefly  discuss  the 
uniqueness  view  of  definites  comparing Hawkins  and  Lobner, then  present  Farkas' 
notion  of  "no choice"  NPs and discuss why Farkas'  story can't be  all there is. In the 
third  section  the  correspondence  between  (de)accenting  and  (non)givenness will  be 
shown, and the different uses will be spelled out within the DRT framework. Moreover, 
the non-givenlgiven distinction will be related to the well-known attributivelreferential 
distinction.  Subsequently,  in  section  four,  I  will  sketch  the  semantics  of  focus  in 
complex  definite  noun  phrases  pointing  out  the  role  of  the  bridging  antecedent  in 
establishing  the  set  of  alternatives. Finally,  we will  come back  to the  scale of noun 
phrases in the definiteness hierarchy and have a brief look at pronouns and indefinites. 
Throughout this  paper only singular definite descriptions (the shed, the old shed, the 
shed of  John's cottage) in argument position will be considered. 
2.  The uniqueness view of definiteness 
Definiteness  is  semantically  associated  either  with  familiarity  or  with  uniqueness. 
According to familiarity theories of definites, e.g. Heim (1982), the referent of a definite 
noun phrase is an entity which is given because it has been mentioned previously in the 
discourse (or because it is prominent in the utterance situation). Uniqueness theories, on 
the  other  hand,  regard  definiteness  as  indicating  that  the  noun  phrase's  referent  is 
unique with respect to some pragmatically given domain. A review of the pros and cons 
of the two perspectives goes beyond the scope of this paper (cf. e.g. Hauenschild 1989). 
Distinguishing between  given  and  non-given  definite  descriptions  I will,  of  course, 
employ a uniqueness account of definiteness. 
I  cf. Farkas (2000) (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
2.1.  Hawkins (1978), (1991) 
A particular prominent  account of  the uniqueness perspective  is Hawkins  (1978) and 
(1991). Hawkins takes the anaphoric and deictic uses of  definites as his starting point. 
The basic  idea  is  that  the  use  of  a  definite  is  felicitous  if,  within  a  pragmatically 
determined  domain, there is exactly one entity satisfying the description  (for plurals: 
there is unique maximal  set within the domain). Pragmatic domains, called P-sets, are 
sets of  entities  structuring the  universe  of  discourse,  and are  provided  by either the 
previous  discourse,  the  utterance  situation,  or  general  knowledge  about  relations 
between entities. The meaning of the definite article is defined relative to a P-set: "The 
conventionally implicates that there is some subset of  entities, {P),  in  the universe of 
discourse which is mutually manifest to Speaker and Hearer on-line, and within which 
definite referents exist and are unique."  (Hawkins, 1991, p.414). Indefinites, as opposed 
to definites, conversationally implicate non-uniqueness. 
For example, the noun phrase the professor  may be felicitously uttered if. there is a 
unique professor within the P-set established by the previous discourse. But it may as 
well  be  felicitously  used  if  the  situation  or  general  world  knowledge  provide  an 
appropriate P-set.  E.g.  if  students  arrive for a new  class, they  may  ask  Who is  the 
professor? because there is a unique professor given by the situation. Or, if a university 
class has been  mentioned  in the previous discourse class, the use of  the professor  is 
felicitous because we know that classes at a university usually have a unique professor. 
Moreover, the appropriate P-set may be inferred  from information within  the definite 
NP itself, e.g. the professor of nzy liizguistics class. Information within the definite NP 
may even re-establish a previous discourse set: the professor we have just  been talking 
about. 
Unlike definite descriptions, demonstrative expressions and pronouns, according to 
Hawkins, do not achieve uniqueness  by making use  of  a P-set.  They "will  require a 
form  of  uniqueness  relative  to  entities  that  are  physically  identifiable  or  textually 
introduced,  without  regard  to  P-sets"  (Hawkins  1991  p.  416).  The  latter  form  of 
uniqueness, however, is not spelled out in the paper. 
2.2.  Lobner (1985) 
Lobner (1985) presents  a uniqueness  theory  of  definites  taking  the opposite  starting 
point, the paradigmatic  cases being those where  the definite article is required by the 
semantics of the neon. Nouns are classified into sortal nouns, which denote sets (e.g. 
table) and  relational  nouns,  which  involve  an  internal  argument  (e.g.  daughter  of 
somebody). Within the class of  relational nouns there are special cases of  functional 
nouns which have a unique value, e.g. mother.' 
According to Lobner the definite article in  all its uses indicates that the descri  tive 
content  has  to  be interpreted  as  a  functional  concept  yielding  a  unique  value!  He 
distinguishes  between  "semantic  definites"  and  "pragmatic  definites".  Semantic 
definites are given by functional nouns, whose internal argument is mainly provided by 
the utterance situation. Being a functional noun a mother e.g. is not acceptable (unless 
Sortal nouns may also be used in a functional way, e.g. rable is used functionally if someone points to 
an orange box and says: The table is laid. Moreover, functional nouns may be used in a sortal way, 
e.g. if a caretaker in a kindergarten informs her colleague: A morher has corrtplained about the  food.  '  Lbbner uses the term  "functional concept" instead of  "function" to stress the procedural  aspect and 
indicate effective computability. nzother is used in a sortal way). For pragmatic definites the functional concept has to be 
established by the context, either by a modifying expression or by an implicit link to a 
node  representing  another  discourse  referent  (Lobner  assumes  a  semantic  network 
representation). For example, in  "Bill went out with a woman last night. The woman 
was nasty to him. " the definite the woman has to be linked to the node representing the 
woman Bill went out with last night which renders a functional concept paraphrased by 
the wonzun Bill  went out with last night. 
2.3.  Farkas (2000), (2001) 
Farkas  (2000)/(2001 in  this  volume)  starts  from  the  so-called  definiteness  hierarchy 
which  stems from cross-linguistic  observations  on  the markedness  of  direct objeck4 
Different types of  nouns phrases form a scale with respect to whether they tend to be 
case-marked if in direct object position: Personal pronouns are on top of the scale, being 
most likely to be marked  as a direct object, followed by proper names, definite noun 
phrases, specific  indefinite  and  non-specific  indefinites. Farkas  rearranges  the linear 
scale into a partial order, including demonstratives and partitives: 
[personal pronouns, proper names] > [definite descriptions, demonstrative descriptions] > 
[partitives, specific indefinites] > non-specifics 
Given that hierarchy, Farkas asks why noun phrases rank  as they do. With respect to 
definites, i.e. pronouns, proper names and definite descriptions, she poses the questions 
(a) what makes them a natural  class, and (b) what distinguishes pronouns and proper 
names on the one hand from definite descriptions on the other. 
Farkas follows Hawkins in viewing definiteness as indicating uniqueness, subsuming 
familiarity  as  a  special  case  of  uniqueness.  Her  central  notion  is  the  notion  of 
"determined  reference"  of  a variable. This is explicated on the basis of DRT (Kamp, 
Reyle  1993): A variable  introduced by a noun phrase has determined reference if  for 
every update of an assignment function embedding the previous (input) DRS the value 
assigned to this variable is the same. Noun phrases introducing a determined reference 
variable are "no-choice".  The notion  of  determined  reference implements uniqueness 
without referring to a particular domain within which the referent has to be unique. The 
only requirement  is that there is no other choice for assigning a value to the variable. 
But  the  reason  why  a  variable  has  a  determined  reference  is  deliberately  left  open 
because this is where pronouns and proper names depart from definite descriptions. 
Pronouns are handled in the usual DRT manner, i.e. they introduce a variable x in the 
domain of  the respective DRS and add an identifying condition x=y  where the newly 
introduced variable is equated with a variable y previously given. Proper names are also 
assumed  to induce an  identifying condition, e.g. x=Sarah,  where  the  referent  of  the 
name stays constant across assignments  and  worlds.  Thus both  pronouns  and proper 
names  contribute  an  identifying  condition  directly  associating  the  variable  they 
introduce with the entity serving as its value. Therefore, proper names and pronouns are 
said to achieve determined reference directly. 
Descriptions, on the other hand, have to achieve determined reference by means of 
the description. This may be the case if the descriptive content denotes a singleton set, 
as  e.g.  the  moon  or  the  strongest  man  in  the  world.  For  descriptions  other  than 
4  Farkas (2000) discusses a typology of definites which is recapitulated  in section 2 of Farkas (2001) in 
this volume. I will mainly refer to the (2000) paper. 
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singletons Farkas assumes that  the domain is restricted to (a subset of) variables that 
have been introduced before, the description being unique within the restricted domain. 
Thus a  noun  phrase  like  the  girl is  interpreted  as  "the  unique  element  among  the 
previously  mentioned  discourse  referents  which  is  a  girl".  According  to  the  (2001) 
paper uniqueness may be restricted to a salient subdomain of the input DRS. 
Answering the questions above, (a) the class of semantically definite noun phrases is 
characterized as  being  no  choice NPs,  and  (b) the  difference between  pronouns  and 
proper names on the one side and definite descriptions on the other stems from their 
different ways  of  achieving  determined  reference,  either  directly  by  introducing  an 
identifying  condition  or by  a  description  eventually  relating  to  a  restricted  domain. 
Pronouns  and  proper  names  outrank  definite  descriptions  on  the  definiteness  scale 
because they achieve determined reference directly. 
In this paper, I will follow Farkas in taking a uniqueness perspective on definites and 
regarding anaphoricity as one way of  achieving uniqueness. Furthermore, I will follow 
her  in distinguishing  between  definites that  achieve determined  reference  directly by 
introducing an identifying condition, and those that achieve determined reference based 
on  their description. But there are some problems: First, the reason she gives for why 
identifying conditions achieve determined reference is not really convincing. She argues 
that the antecedent has determined reference because for any assignment function the 
value is uniquely determined. But this is trivially true for any variable simply because 
assignments  are  functions.  In  fact,  an  identifying  condition  does  not  per  se render 
determined  reference - in  principle  the  variable  can  be  identified  with  any  of  the 
variables  previously  given. To  determine the  referent  we  have to  take  a  resolution 
procedure  into  account  which  is  based  on  the  order  of  accessibility  of  discourse 
referents  and  will  (normally)  give  a unique  result  Second, Farkas'  view  of  definite 
descriptions  implies  that  definite  descriptions  which  don't  involve  singleton 
descriptions must refer to given referents. I will argue below that this assumption cannot 
be maintained. 
3.  Given vs. non-given definite descriptions 
This paper  focuses on  definite  descriptions.  The  central  claim  is  that  even  definite 
descriptions can come both ways, either being identical to an  antecedent or exploiting 
their  descriptive  content,  depending  on  whether  or  not  the  descriptive  content  is 
accented.  If  deaccented, the definite represents an  identity  anaphor. Let us call these 
uses  "given  definites".  If  there is an  accent on  (part of) the descriptive content, the 
definite is not an identity anaphor (which does not imply that there is no anaphoricity at 
all). Since these definites do not refer to a given referent, they  are called  "non-given 
definites"."~iven  and non-given definites are, of course, uses of definite descriptions - 
throughout  this  paper  we  are  talking  about  occurrences  of  definite  descriptions  in 
utterances, not about definite descriptions in isolation.) 
We will first turn to the non-given definites in this section, demonstrating how they 
achieve uniqueness, and show that they need an accented part in  their description to do 
so. Next we will come to the given definites, showing that they have to be deaccented, 
and  discuss  the  accessibility  order  of  antecedents  which  is  basic  to  resolve  the 
They are called  "nongiven"  instead  of  "novel"  because  they may  involve  a  bridging  anaphoric 
relation, see below. 
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definites  will  be  given. Finally  the  two uses  are  related  to the  referentiallattributive 
distinction which is well known in the literature. 
3.1.  Non-given definites 
Let us first consider non-given definite descriptions. Since a non-given definite is not 
identical to a given discourse referent, it has to make use of its description to single out 
a unique referent. There are two possibilities:  Either  the  description  is  such  that  it 
determines a unique referent by itself, or it needs the support of a "bridging"  antecedent. 
Prototypical examples for self-sufficient descriptions are nouns that denote a singleton 
due  to  their  semantics  (the pope)  or  superlative  constructions  (the biggest  crook). 
Complex  descriptions  involving  adjectival  modification,  attributive  genitives  or 
restrictive relative clauses may also be able to determine a unique referent (the Italian 
president, the president ofitnly, the man who is elected  for president in ~tal~).~ 
According to our assumptions the description has to be accented. Compare (5)(a) and 
(b). In  (5)(a) pope  is  accented.  Since it  is  an  out-of-the-blue  utterance,  the  definite 
description  obviously introduces  a  novel  referent.'  In  (5)(b)  the pope  is  deaccented, 
rendering the utterance unacceptable in the beginning of  a discourse. (6)(a)-(c) present 
examples for complex noun phrases. To be acceptable as an out-of-the-blue utterance, 
the  entire  description  has  to  be  accented,  cf.  (6)(a).  Still,  if  at  least  part  of  the 
description  is  accented,  the  definite  is  acceptable  as  introducing  a  novel  referent, 
(6)(b)l(c). 
(5)  (What's new?) 
a.  Last week I met the POPE. 
b.  #Last week I MET the pope. 
(6)  a.  Last week I met the ITALIAN PRESIDENT1 the PRESIDENT of 
ITALY 
b.  Last week I met the Italian PRESIDENT1 ITALIAN president. 
c.  Last week I met the president of ITALY I the PRESIDENT of Italy. 
If  the description  of  a definite is not suited to determine a unique referent by  itself, it 
needs the support of a "bridging"  antecedent (we are still talking about non-given cases, 
i.e.  excluding  identity  anaphors).  Consider  the  rooj  the  dean  and  the  girl  in  the 
examples in  (7). In  each of them the description relates to  a given referent to achieve 
uniqueness: The roof is part of the previously introduced cottage, the dean is supposed 
to be the dean of the faculty, and the girl is obviously a member of John's children. 
(7)  a.  John has an old cottage. Last summer, he repaired the ROOF. 
b.  The faculty has a meeting. It is chaired by the DEAN. 
c.  John has two children. The GIRL is called Sue. 
Familiarity theories of  definites usually regard these cases as being  (implicitly) given 
because  there is a relation  to  a given  referent.  If  we  regard  these definites  as being 
given,  however,  we  would  have  to  believe  that  whenever  a  discourse  referent  is 
1  The last two examples may be regarded as involving an explicit bridging antecedent. 
7  Since it is an outof<hehlue utterance the accent has to he a default sentence accent. But we will for 
the moment ignore the difference between  sentence accent and contrastive accent, and  we will also 
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introduced,  all  entities  related  to  that  referent  are  introduced  simultaneously. 
Introducing the cottage referent in (7a), for example, would simultaneously trigger the 
introduction  of  the roof, the door, the kitchen, the mortgage, the previous owner, the 
landscape  etc. This is  improbable.  But  if  we  don't  accept  that  all  these  entities  are 
introduced together with the cottage referent, then we have to admit that the roof  in (7a), 
although  involving  an  anaphoric relation, does  introduce  a novel  referent. The same 
argument applies to the dean in (7b): If  the you reject the idea that introducing a faculty 
referent  simultaneously  triggers  the  introduction  of  a  dean  referent  then  the  dean 
referent has to be novel.  In  (7c) the  situation is slightly different because there is a 
plural referent which the girl is a member of. So  it might be argued that the girl has in 
fact been introduced by introducing the children. But note that there is no chance for a 
pronoun to pick up the girl, we don't even know that there is a girl among the children. 
This is strong evidence that the girl introduces a novel referent, too. 
Let us call the antecedents employed by the definites in  (7) to achieve uniqueness 
"bridging  antecedents",  and the relation between the referent of the definite description 
and the  antecedent a "bridging relation".'  The nature of  the bridging relation may be 
rather unspecific. Note, that it need not be a function (cf. membership, part-of etc.). It  is 
only the combination of  the bridging relation and the description of  the definite which 
yields uniqueness. For example, in (7a) being a part of  John's cottage is by no means 
unique - the cottage will presumably comprise more than  one part.  But being  a part 
which is a roof has to be unique for the definite to be felicitous. 
In (8) the example from the introduction is repeated. This example shows that it is 
the  accent  alone which  tells us  how  to  interpret  the  definite: With  an  accent on the 
descriptive part  the  definite  has  to  be  interpreted  as  introducing  a  novel  discourse 
referent  and  since shed  doesn't  denote a singleton  it  needs a bridging antecedent to  -  -  L. 
achieve uniqueness. Thus in  @)(a) the shed  is  interpreted  as  the  shed belonging  to 
John's cottage and is newly introduced. But if the description is deaccented, as in (8)(b),  .  ..  . 
the  definitehas to  be  identified with  a previously given  discourse referent. Thus we 
infer that the shed refers to John's cottage the speaker making a disparaging remark. 
(8)  (John has an old cottage.) 
a.  Last summer he reconstructed the SHED. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed. 
A  similar  example  is  the  one  in  (9)  from  van  Deemter  (1994).  According  to  van 
Deemter,  if  the  noun  phrase  the  women  is  accented,  it  has  to  be  interpreted  as  a 
subsectional  anaphor referring to  a proper pan of  the antecedent. From our point  of 
view, being a proper part is just  one of  various possible bridging relations. As opposed 
to the example in (8), the definite description in (9) is in the topic pan of the sentence. 
Thus in (9)(a) the accent renders the definite a contrastive topic. Nevertheless, it triggers 
the introduction of a new discourse referent. 
(9)  (The crowd was approaching the castle.) 
a.  The WOMEN were very EXITED. 
b.  The women were very EXITED. 
Jager (1998) also shows that accenting has an influence on noun phrase interpretation. 
8  The notion of an inferential "bridge" goes back to Haviland, Clark (1974). Our "bridging antecedent" 
is called an indirect antecedent there, e.g. We  checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm. He discusses weak  quantifiers  in  topic  position  and compares  cases like (lO)(a)/(b). 
Both (a) and (b) trigger a partitive reading interpretation of three unicorns (provided, 
according to Jager, that the accent is a rising one). But depending on the position  of the 
accent, the noun either denotes a property of the actual referent, cf. (a), or it denotes a 
property of the antecedent, cf. (b). In this respect, the examples in (10) are similar to the 
ones in (8) and (9). 
(10)  a.  There is a whole herd of unusual animals all around. Three UNICORNS 
are in the 
GARDEN. 
b.  There is a whole herd of unicorns all around. THREE unicorns are in the 
GARDEN. 
That there is a correspondence between accenting and the reference of  a definite has 
already been discussed in Bosch (1988). Bosch uses the notions of explicit and implicit 
focus, the former representing entities mentioned in the preceding discourse, i.e. given 
referents, and the latter representing entities from the scenario, e.g. the bridged cases 
above which we would classify as being non-given. According to Bosch, deaccented 
definite  referential  expressions,  full  NPs  and  personal  pronouns  alike,  take  their 
referents  from  explicit  focus,  whereas  intonationally  marked  definite  referential 
expressions draw upon implicit focus. His example in (1 1) is similar to the example in 
(8)  showing  that  accenting  prevents  the  definite  from  taking  up  a  given  referent. 
Moreover, Bosch  gives  an  explanation  which  comes  close to  the  idea presented  in 
Farkas (2000)/(2001) and in this paper, distinguishing between access via classification 
(i.e. description)  and  access via linguistic properties such as gender and  number  (i.e. 
non-semantic properties of antecedents). 
(I I)  When Jones returned 
a.  ... they ignored {him,  the idiot, the bastard, the old goat, the pig). 
b.  ... they ignored (HIM, the IDIOT, the BASTARD, the old GOAT, the 
PIG}. 
Let  us  now  briefly  consider  functional  nouns,  which  in  Lobner  (1985)  are  the 
paradigmatic cases of definites descriptions. Consider roof and dean in (7) above. They 
are clearly functional in the sense of  Lobner because (usually) a house has exactly one 
roof, and a faculty has exactly one dean. In (7) the definites achieve uniqueness exactly 
as Lobner predicts, since the bridging antecedents correspond to the internal argument 
given by the semantics of  the nouns.  So, instead of assuming a bridging relation, one 
might regard the noun as denoting a function taking the faculty referent as its argument 
and yielding the dean-referent as its value. However, the bridging antecedent need not 
coincide with the internal argument, cf. (12). Although the internal argument is clearly 
preferred as a bridging antecedent, Lobner's  functional concept doesn't  cover the full 
range of bridging cases. 
(12)  I met a couple at the party yesterday. The wife was beautiful. 
Moreover, a functional noun  may, of course, occur in a given definite. Suppose, e.g., 
that  (7)(a) is continued by  He  had  tried  to evade  that job,  but finally  the  roof  was 
leaking.  This  time,  the  roof  is  clearly  an  identity  anaphor.  Thus,  whether  it's  a (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
functional noun or a sortal or relational noun doesn't make any difference for the way in 
which  the  definite  achieves  uniqueness  (except  for  the  preference  for  a  bridging 
antecedent to correspond to the internal argument). Viewing definiteness as indicating a 
function is intuitively appealing because the mathematical concept of  a function gives 
us existence and uniqueness for free. But functional nouns are no first class definites. 
3.2.  Given definites 
As discussed above, givenness is used here in a strict sense, for identity anaphors only. 
Non-given  definites make use of  their descriptive content to  achieve uniqueness. But 
how  do given  definites  achieve uniqueness?  Identification  with  another referent,  as 
such, does not  give a unique result. Of course, the descriptive content of  the definite 
will exclude unsuited candidates. Still there may be more than  one referent  satisfying 
the description. Consider the man in (13). There are four possible referents: the man, the 
bar, the suitcase, the barkeeper. The description man rules out the bar and the suitcase. 
But the barkeeper will probably be a man, too (cf. Heusinger 2000 for more examples of 
this  type).  The  reason  why  we  will  not  identify  the  man  with  the  barkeeper  is  a 
structural one, given by binding constraints. 
(13)  (A man came into the bar. He was carrying a black suitcase.) 
The barkeeper stared at the man with sudden alarm. 
For given definites as well  as for pronouns, to determine the referent appropriate for 
identification we have to take the accessibility of discourse referents into account. In the 
field of natural language processing there is a broad discussion on anaphora resolution. 
It  is  well-known  that  there  are various  factors contributing to  the  accessibility  of  a 
referent (cf. e.g. Preuss et al. 1994, Grosz et al. 1995). Such factors relate to structural 
properties  of  the  respective  noun  phrases,  e.g.  distance  and  syntactic  position,  and 
define an  order of accessible antecedents. Semantic conditions enter the game if  there 
are equally accessible antecedents, thus reducing ambiguity. So the question of  which 
referent  has  to  be  identified  with  a  given  definite  is  primarily  determined  by  the 
accessibility of referents. Its descriptive content has only an auxiliary function. This is 
the reason why (a) given definites may be substituted for by pronouns (thus stripping 
their descriptive content), and (b) given definites, in  spite of  their descriptive content, 
have to obey the same accessibility rules as pronouns. 
There  is  a  consequence  which  is  often  neglected  in  semantics:  The  idea that  a 
discourse referent once introduced is forever accessible turns out to be a fiction. After a 
certain (rather small) number of ensuing sentences a referent is definitely not accessible 
any more. But if  a referent is no longer accessible, it can't be regarded as being given 
anymore. So it  may be introduced again. Introducing a discourse referent, after all, is 
just  like putting someone on the stage. It will be pushed in the background step by step 
by its followers. The notion of givenness employed here is not only restricted to identity 
anaphors but the referent to be identified with the anaphor has to be accessible as well. 
To conclude: Farkas skips an important step when  saying a pronoun  introduces  a 
referent x together with an equation x=y where y is a given discourse referent. In fact, a 
pronoun introduces half of an equation, x=?, and there is, first and foremost, a request to 
find  the  appropriate  antecedent.  To achieve  this  accessibility  has  to  be  taken  into 
account. This applies to pronouns as well as given definite descriptions. 3.3.  Two uses of definite descriptions 
Accounting for the different ways of achieving a unique referent, we will  assume that 
given definites, i.e. identity anaphors, are presupposed. This is in  accordance with the 
main stream view on definites in the literature (e.g. Heim 1982). Non-given definites, as 
opposed to this, will be regarded as being asserted, in a line with indefinites introducing 
a  novel  discourse referent.  It  may  be  argued  that  the  existence and the  uniqueness 
requirements are presupposed because they can hardly be affected by a denial. But at 
least the fact that the novel referent has the property denoted by its descriptive content is 
part of the assertion and can be denied (Last summer, John reconstructed the SHED. - 
No, he reconstructed the HEN HOUSE.). That such a denial is impossible if the definite 
is in topic position may well be due to the characteristics of topics. 
Spelling  this  out  in  a  DRT  framework,  given  definites  will  be  represented  like 
pronouns  whereas  non-given  definites  are  treated  like  indefinites  plus  uniqueness 
condition. For  example,  in  (15a)  pope  carries  an  accent  indicating  novelty.  So the 
definite triggers the introduction of a novel variable y and induces the conditions that y 
satisfies the description and is unique, as shown in (15)(b). 
(15)  a.  John met the POPE. 
b.  [x, y: x=John, pope(y), [[z: pope(z)] -->[: z=yl, met(x,y)] 
In  (16) the first sentence is represented by the DRS in (16)(b). In  the second sentence 
girl  is deaccented. So the definite induces an  identifying condition plus the condition 
that the referent satisfies the girl-predicate. Both conditions are presupposed  (indicated 
by  underlining).  Following the presupposition-as-anaphors  theory  (cf, van  der Sandt 
1992), presuppositions have to be  bound or accommodated.  Updating  of  K1  and K2 
results in the DRS in (16e), where the girl-referent from K2 has been identified with the 
girl-referent in K1 (assuming that the girl-referent in K1 is the most accessible referent 
which  is a girl). The second girl-condition  is  supposed to be bound by  the first one. 
(1 6)(e) then is equivalent to (I 6)(f). 
(16)  a.  John met a girl. 
b.  Kt: [x, y: x=John, girl(y), met(x,y)] 
c.  The girl was BEAUTIFUL. 
d.  K2: [z: z=?, girl(z), beautiful(z)] 
e.  K1 + K2: [x, y, z: x=John, girl(y), met(x,y), z=y, girl@),  beautiful(z)] 
f.  K1 + K2: [x, y:  xJohn, girl(y), met(x,y), girl(y), beautiful(y)] 
In (17) and (18) the different readings of the shed-example are demonstrated. In (17)(c) 
shed is accented thus introducing a novel referent. Since shed doesn't denote a singleton 
(due to lexical and/or world knowledge) the definite requires a bridging antecedent (w) 
together  with  bridging  relation  R,  and  it  introduces  a  uniqueness  condition.  The 
identifying  conditions  for  the  pronoun  and  those  for  the  bridging  antecedent  are 
presupposed. Moreover the bridging relation  is presupposed, cf. (17)(d). Updating K1 
with K2 results in  (17)(e) where the identification conditions are resolved. (Note, that 
the  shed  cannot  be  identified  with  the cottage  because  the  bridging  relation  is  not 
allowed to be reflexive, cf. the element-of relation or the part-of relation.) The fact that (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
the bridging relation holds between the cottage-referent and the shed- referent has been 
acc~mmodated.~  (l7)(e) is equivalent to (17)(f). 
(17)  a.  John has an old cottage. 
b.  K1: [x, y: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y)] 
c.  He reconstructed the SHED. 
d.  K2: [u,v, w: u=?, w=?, shed(v), R(w,v), [z: R(w,z), shed(z)] -->[: z=vl], 
reconstmcted(u,v)] 
e.  K1+K2:  [x,  y,  u,  v,  w:  x=John,  old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), u=x,  w=y, 
shed(v), R(w,v), [[z: R(w,z), shed(z)] --> [: z=vJ, reconstmcted(u,v)] 
f.  Kl+K2: [x, y, v: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), shed(v), R(y,v), [[z: 
R(y,z), shed(z)] --> [: z=vJ, reconstmcted(x,v)] 
In  (18)(b) shed is deaccented thus indicating that it  has to be identified with  a given 
referent.  Both  identifying  condition  and  the  descriptive  condition  are  presupposed. 
Updating  renders  the DRS  in  (18)(d) identifying  the  shed-referent  with  the  cottage 
referent. The descriptive condition has to be accommodated. 
(1 8)  a.  John has an old cottage. 
b.  Last summer he RECONSTRUCTED the shed. 
c.  K2': [u,v: u=?, v=?, shed(v), reconstructed(u,v)] 
d.  Kl+K2': [x, y, u, v: x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), u=x, v=y, 
shed(v), reconstmcted(u,v)] 
e.  Kl+K2': [x, y:  x=John, old-cottage(y),  owns(x,y), shed(y), 
reconstmcted(x,y)] 
Comparing  this  analysis  with  the  account  of  definites  proposed  by  Farkas,  given 
definites go with pronouns achieving determined reference directly. It's only the non- 
given  ones that have to  make use of  their descriptive content to achieve determined 
reference. Moreover, the latter do not require uniqueness with respect to the referents 
introduced  before,  but  uniqueness  with  respect  to  the  world,  in  most  cases  being 
supported by  a bridging  antecedent.  The analysis  of  definite descriptions  given  here 
doesn't agree with Farkas'  analysis of  definite descriptions. But it does agree with her 
analysis of definites in general, making a clear distinction between definites which are 
directly no-choice and definites which are no-choice by description. 
This analysis of definite descriptions admits two uses of definite descriptions. But it 
does not  admit two readings of  the definite article. The definite article the  uniformly 
indicates  the  uniqueness  requirement.  The  two  uses  are  due  to  accenting  and 
deaccenting, respectively,  which  is a  feature given  on  the  surface  of  the  linguistic 
expressions. Thus the two uses must not be regarded as an ambiguity which has to be 
resolved  by  the  hearer  depending  on  the  respective  context.  Instead,  the  speaker 
indicates  the intended use by  intonation. If  the  intended use  doesn't  match  with  the 
context. the utterance is not felicitous. 
Let  us  assume  that  R  is  an  underspecified  relation  that  may  be  madc  more  specific  by  world 
knowledge inferences. 
24  1 3.4.  Referential vs. attributive use 
Naturally, the idea that there are two uses of definite descriptions is not a novel one. It 
was first proposed by Donnellan (1966) who distinguished between a referential and an 
attributive use of definite descriptions. The attributive use is similar to Russel's view of 
definite  descriptions  assuming  that  the  description  is  part  of  the  assertion.  The 
referential use comes close to  Frege's  or Strawson's  view  where the existence of an 
appropriate referent is regarded as a presupposition. But there is a subtle difference that 
will be discussed below. 
Donnellan's  famous example is  "Who is the man with the martini?". Suppose the 
chairman  of  a teetotalers  meeting  is  informed  that  someone in  the  room  is  secretly 
drinking a martini. Then he may ask this question without having a particular person in 
mind. But if  the same question  is asked by a guest at a party  seeing an  interesting- 
looking person holding a martini glass, then the question is about that particular person. 
In the former case the definite description is used attributively, asking something about 
whoever or whatever fits the description. In  the latter case it  is used  referentially,  to 
enable the hearer to pick out whom or what the question is about. In the attributive use 
the referent has to be determined  solely by  means of the description  whereas  in  the 
referential  use the description  is only accompanying a demonstration act. This is why 
Kaplan paraphrases the referential use by a demonstrative:  "Who is that man with the 
martirzi?" or "Who is that?" followed by an appositive, parenthetical, whispered  "the 
rnan with the martini"  (Kaplan 1989, Afterthoughts, p. 583) 
Donnellan does not argue in terms givenness or novelty of discourse referents and, of 
course,  he  is  far  from  taking  accenting  into  account.  Nevertheless  the 
referentiallattributive distinction seems to correspond to the givenhon-given distinction 
made  in  this  paper:  The  correspondence between  non-given  and  attributively  used 
definites is evident, both requiring that the referent is determined solely by means of the 
descriptive content. To realize the correspondence between given and referentially used 
definites  we have to regard  the  accessibility  of  discourse  referents  as the  anaphoric 
counterpart  to  a  demonstration  act.  Thus  the  context  may  be  either  the  previous 
discourse  or  the  utterance  situation.  Given  definites  as  well  as  referentially  used 
definites  involve  direct  reference.  Either  accessibility  of  an  antecedent  or  a 
demonstration  act  will  provide  a  unique  solution  for  identification,  the  descriptive 
content being mere auxiliary information. 
To see that in the referential use the description in fact has to be deaccented whereas 
in the attributive use there has to be an accent, consider (19) and (20) below. In (19) the 
referential  use  is  demonstrated.  Assume  a  situation  like this:  Sherlock Holmes  and 
Watson are chasing a drug dealer gang. They are sitting in a bar watching a clandestine 
meeting. One of the suspects makes a call on a mobile phone and then starts to leave the 
bar. Homes advises Watson: 
(19)  FOLLOW the man with the mobile. 
As against that, to demonstrate the attributive use, assume that Holmes and Watson are 
on their way to the bar where the gangsters will meet, and Holmes tells Watson what to 
do: ... One of the men will have a mobile. They will wait for a phone call and then leave 
separately. ... 
(20)  Follow the man with the MOBILE. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
There is an additional property of the referential use which makes Donnellan's account 
notoriously difficult: According to Donnellan, in the referential use the description may 
not apply to the referent without rendering the use of the definite infelicitous (and the 
sentence without a truth-value). For example, the man with the martini may actually be 
drinking water, but  the  definite  will  still  refer  to the  interesting-looking  person  the 
speaker was curious about. On the other hand, Donnellan explicitly claims that by using 
the  expression  referentially  the  speaker  presupposes  that  this  very  man  is  drinking 
martini, which from the point of view of semantics, is simply contradictory. 
One may shift this problem into the area of pragmatics allowing for accommodation 
as long as there is sufficient similarity (martini being similar to water or white wine, but 
not  to  tomato juice).  However,  there  is  an  observation  discussed  in  Bosch  (1988) 
indicating  that  the  discrepancy  in  the  referential  use  between  the  presupposed 
description and the actual properties of the referent is a systematic one: For a definite 
description,  if  the description  is  accented  it  cannot  be used  metaphorically, but  has 
apply literally. Bosch notes that the accented NP in (21)(b) as opposed to the deaccented 
variant,  cannot  be  interpreted  as being co-referential  with  Jones, but  that  a  "literal" 
interpretation where the pig indeed refers to a pig is possible. 
(21)  a.  When Jones returned they ignored the pig. 
b.  When Jones returned they ignored the PIG. 
Now suppose that Holmes is very upset because his own daughter is addicted to drugs. 
Then in the first situation he can give Watson the order in (22) instead of (19). But in 
the  second  situation, if  Holmes  would  utter  (23)  instead  of  (20)  Watson  would  be 
completely lost because presumably there is no such animal in the bar. 
(22)  FOLLOW the pig. 
(23)  Follow the PIG. 
In  the referential case, but not in  the attributive one, pig  can be used  as a derogatory 
designation  for the  drug dealer. This, firstly, confirms Donnellan's  claim  that  in  the 
referential  use  the  referent  need  not  exactly fit  the  description. Secondly, occurring 
systematically  with  metaphoric  descriptions  we  can  no  longer  attribute this  effect to 
some sort of  accidental similarity, as in the case of martini looking like water. We may 
explain the discrepancy effect of the referential use along the following  lines: In  the 
attributive  use,  the  description  is  the  only  information  available  to  determine  the 
referent. In  the referential use, on the other hand, the description has a mere auxiliary 
function,  the  demonstration  being  decisive  to  determine  the  referent.  Hence  the 
descriptive  information  need not perfectly  match  with  the referent's  properties.  Still, 
there are two awkward questions left: (a) How much deviation is possible? -  the man 
~virh  the nznrtini will not work for a man with tomato juice, and (b) what are we to make 
out  of  a  presupposition  which  contradicts  contextual  information? - according  to 
lexicallworld  knowledge the intersection between  man  and pigs  is empty, and this is 
essential in the attributivelaccented use. 4.  Focus in definites descriptions 
We have seen in the previous section that accenting does have a decisive influence on 
the  interpretation  of  a  definite  description  making  it  introduce  a  novel  discourse 
referent.  How  does  this  combine  with  the  focus  semantic  interpretation  of  definite 
descriptions? The  general  idea of  focus  semantics  is  that  a  focus  triggers  a  set  of 
alternatives providing, e.g. the quantificational domain of adverbs like only. This idea is 
widely  accepted. Nevertheless  the  nature  and  the  range  of  the alternatives  is  by  no 
means  clear.  Assuming  that  the  set  of  alternatives  comprises  the  entire domain  of 
entities of the appropriate type renders the idea of alternatives trivial. But constraining it 
by employing a specific function, ALT, is also problematic. In this section, I will show 
that for definite descriptions the bridging antecedent plays a central role in determining 
the appropriate set of alternatives. 
Let us  start with  the example in (24) taken from Heusinger (1998). The context is 
supposed  to  be  an  international  faculty  party.  There  are  some  students  and  some 
professors from various countries including exactly one Dutch professor: 
(24)  Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John. 
In Heusinger (1998) the Alternative Semantics of Rooth (1992) is extended to apply to 
complex  definite NPs.  Alternative  Semantics is  a  two-dimensional  theory  of  focus, 
computing simultaneously the ordinary meaning of an expression  denoted by [a]" ) 
and its alternative meaning, i.e. the set of alternatives for this expression (denoted by 
[@IA  ). For example, in  "John only talked to SUE. " the focus on Sue triggers a set of 
alternatives comprising individuals,  {Sue,  Bill, Mary, ....I. The alternative meaning of 
the VP talked to SUE inherits these alternatives rendering a set of predicates,  (talk-to- 
Sue, talk-to-Bill, talk-to-Mary, ....). The meaning of only then consists in asserting that 
none of the alternatives except the ordinary meaning applies to the John. 
Following this schema, the definite description the DUTCH professor in (24) should 
be computed by combining the alternatives of DUTCH with the meaning of professor, 
and combining the result with the meaning of the definite article. Heusinger assumes the 
alternatives  of DUTCH  to  be  given  as in  (25)(a). They  are combined  with  the noun 
denotation by intersection, cf. (25)(b). Then there is a problem with the definite article 
which  we  will  skip  here. The interesting  point  with  respect  to our question  is that, 
according  to  Heusinger,  the  alternative  meaning  of  the  definite  description  should 
comprise the union of the intersections, i.e. (25)(c): 
(25)  a.  [DUTCHFIA  = ALT(dutch') = (dutch', english', french', ...  ) 
b.  [DUTCHF  profe~sor]~  =  {dutch'nprof',  english'nprof', 
french'nprof', ...  ) 
c.  [the  DUTCHF  profes~or]~  =  u  (dutch'nprof',  english'nprof', 
french'nprof', ...I 
Suppose, however, that there is a stateless professor at the party. If  Sam introduced the 
stateless professor to John, the proposition in (24) is clearly false. But if  we assume the 
ALT-function to enumerate nationalities, the stateless professor will not be an element 
of  the  alternative  meaning  of  "the DUTCH  professor"  as  given  in  (25)(c).  Hence 
"introduce the stateless professor to John" will not be excluded by the meaning of only. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
You will, of  course, argue that being stateless is a relevant alternative to being Dutch, 
English, French etc. and  the ALT-function  has to include this property.  But consider 
(26) and imagine a situation like this: Sue and Ben, and no other children live in a house 
with a large garden. Each of the children has a favorite tree in the garden, but there are 
many  other  trees.  In  this  situation  the  contextually  relevant  alternatives  to  Sue are 
clearly Sue and Ben, and nobody else. The proposition in (26) is intuitively false if  Sam 
watered  any  tree  in  the  garden  except  for  Sue's  tree.  However,  computing  the 
alternative meaning of  SUE'S tree in the manner of (25)(c) will give us just  Sue's and 
Ben's tree. As in the case of the stateless professor, the other trees will not be included, 
and hence, not be taken into account by the meaning of only. But in this case it does not 
seem appropriate for the ALT-function to include a property like "childless". 
(26)  Sam only watered SUE'S tree, 
The problem of the stateless professor and the "childless"  trees stems from the implicit 
assumption  that  the  alternatives  given  by  a  focussed  modifier  cover  the  entire 
background of the definite, i.e. the entire set of  professors and trees. But that can only 
be guaranteed if the alternatives of a focussed expression comprise the entire domain of 
the respective type, e.g. [DUTCHFIA  = D<e,tz. The reason for using the ALT-function 
was to bring in contextual restrictions. But, obviously, this is the wrong place. To give 
the correct results, the set of alternatives related to the definite description in (24) has to 
comprise all professors present at the party, regardless of  their nationality (or whether 
they are stateless or have dual nationality). The relevant restriction is, rather, a different 
one:  The  set  of  alternatives  of  the  DUTCH  professor  in  (24)  should  not  include 
professors who stayed away from the party. 
To see that this is the correct restriction, let us first consider the example in  (27). 
Suppose, Sam is the one who has to take care of the guests visiting the institute, and 
show them around. 
(27)  (Yesterday Sam met with a Dutch group.) 
Samlhe only introduced the PROFESSOR to John 
The definite the PROFESSOR in  (27j obviously refers to the Dutch group. Due to the 
accent it introduces a novel discourse referent, but as professors are by no means unique 
in  the  world  the  definite  has  to  make  use  of  a  bridging  antecedent  to  achieve 
uniqueness. The Dutch group is a suitable antecedent inducing a membership relation. 
Thus the PROFESSOR in (27) is interpreted as the unique member of the Dutch group 
who  is  a  professor.  From  (27)  we  can  infer  that  Sam did  not  introduce  any  other 
member of  the Dutch group to John. But we can not infer that Sam did not introduce 
somebody else to John. If, for example, Sam introduced some nice girls from a Finnish 
group to John, (27) would still be true. Hence, the relevant set of alternatives for the 
PROFESSOR in  (27) is mediated by the same bridging antecedent which also mediates 
the uniqueness  of  the referent  itself, i.e. the Dutch  group. Moreover, the alternatives 
have to  stand  in  the  same relation  to  the  bridging  antecedent  as  the  referent  of  the 
definite description does, i.e. membership. 
The  definite  in  (24),  i.e.  the  DUTCH  professor  is  no  more  unique  than  the 
PROFESSOR in  (27). Similar to the latter it needs a bridging  antecedent to satisfy the 
uniqueness condition imposed by the article. Suppose the context is like this: (28)  (The international faculty party last week was a great success. Many students 
and even some professors appeared.) 
Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John. 
Then  the DUTCH professor  has  to be  interpreted as relating to the professors  which 
appeared  at  the  party.  Compared  to  the  simple description  in  (27)  in  the  complex 
description there is a deaccented part, i.e. professors.  According to the deaccented part 
the  bridging  antecedent  has  to  comprise  professors,  and  there  has  to  be  a  unique 
member  of  the  professors-antecedent  who  is  a  Dutchman.  Analogous  to  (27),  the 
statement in (28) is true even if  Sam introduced some professor to John who did not go 
to the party. So, as in the case of  (27), the bridging antecedent gives us the relevant set 
of alternatives. 
There are two implications: First, for bridged definites, in determining the relevant 
set  of  alternatives  the  focussed  element  doesn't play  a role.  Constraining  the  set of 
alternatives of the complex definite description by constraining the alternatives of the 
focussed  element,  i.e.  using  an  ALT-function,  may  give  too  few  elements,  cf.  the 
stateless professor and the "childless"  trees. Instead, the set of  alternatives is provided 
by the bridging antecedent, including only elements that stand in the same relation to 
the bridging  antecedent as the definite's referent does. Second, being provided by the 
bridging antecedent the set of  alternatives (minus the definite's referent) is an genuine 
anaphor.1° It  may in  fact be picked up explicitly by the others, as in (29)."  Thus the 
focus-semantic analysis of a definite description has to match with the semantics of the 
others (cf. Kamp 2000). 
The  definite,  but  not  the  indefinite  others,  is  adequate  to  refer  to  the  elements 
excluded by only. The referent of the others has to be bound to the alternatives-anaphor 
triggered by bhe DUTCH professor. 
(29)  (Sam only introduced the DUTCH professor to John.) 
The others were dancing all the time. 
5.  Conclusions 
Let us finally come back to the scale of noun phrases in the definiteness hierarchy. The 
analysis  of  definite  descriptions  given  here  is  perfectly  compatible  with  Farkas' 
distinction between definites making use of  identification  and definites making use of 
their descriptive content. It departs from Farkas' analysis only with  respect to definite 
descriptions showing that the division line between  inherently no-choice definites and 
description based no-choice definites lies within the area of definite descriptions: If  the 
description  is  deaccented  the  definite  has  to  be  identified  with  a  given  discourse 
referent, but if  there is an  accented part it introduces a novel  discourse referent. This 
analysis  confirms  the  idea  that  there  are  two  uses  of  definite  descriptions 
(givenlreferential vs. non-givenlattributive) without, however, stipulating an ambiguity 
'O  This is in a line with the account in Rooth (1992) where at least one of the alternatives has to be bound 
(or accommodated). 
"  Note that the indefinite others would not be adequate: 
Sam only irlrrod~rced  the DUTCHprofessor to John. #Others were dancing all the time. (De)accenting Definite Descriptions 
of  the  definite  article.  Instead,  the  intended  use  is  indicated  on  the  surface of  the 
linguistic expression by intonational features. 
Taking the full scale of noun phrases into account the question arises how accenting 
affects the end points of the scale, i.e. pronouns and proper names, on the one hand, and 
indefinite noun phrases, on the other. Pronouns and proper names may be accented too. 
So we might assume that they also introduce a novel referent when accented. There are 
cases that  seem to support this idea. In  (30), for example, the pronouns obviously do 
introduce novel referents, and in fact they have to be accented."  So we could argue that 
in  (30) the minimal  descriptive content of  the pronoun,  i.e. being male or female, is 
exploited to establish a novel referent via bridging to the couple referent. 
(30)  (Last week I met a remarkable couple.) 
HE looks after the children and SHE makes a lot of money 
However, the majority of  accented pronouns does not  support this  view. Pronouns as 
well  as proper  names  can  clearly  be  accented without  introducing  a novel  discourse 
referent.  Actually,  accented  pronouns  and  proper  names  are  prototypical 
counterexamples to the focus-novelty correspondence, cf. the examples in (31) and (32) 
from Schwarzschild (1999). 
(31)  (Who did John's mother vote for?) 
She voted for JOHN. 
(32)  (Who did John's mother praise?) 
She praised HIM. 
Schwarzschild  concludes  from  these  examples  that  although  lack  of  intonational 
prominence  indicates  givenness,  the  converse  doesn't  hold:  It  is  not  the  case  that 
prominence indicates novelty. In this paper we have seen that within certain limits, i.e. 
related to the descriptive part of definite descriptions, the converse does hold. But we 
deliberately  excluded  cases  where  the  accent  is  on  the  definite  article  itself,  or  a 
demonstrative, as in (33): 
(33)  a.  He would be THE man for the job. 
b.  (witness pointing to one of the defendants:) 
I saw THIS man coming out of the bank. 
In  (33) accenting clearly does not trigger the introduction of  a novel  referent. It just 
indicates that there are alternatives, e.g. in (33)(b) there are other demonstration acts the 
witness could have made. Maybe accenting pronouns is ambiguous, either concerning 
their descriptive content, or concerning the referential capacity similar to (33)(b). 
Considering indefinite  noun  phrases  at  the  other  end of  the  scale, Krifka (1999) 
argues  for a  special  class of  "non-novel  indefinites"  that  presuppose  their  discourse 
referents and have to be deaccented. Evidence for this class stems e.g. from adverbial 
12  Such examples require  animated referents. Analogous German examples with  unanimated  referents 
are not acceptable (in  German, pronouns are marked  for gender or sex). This is an examples from 
Bosch (1988): 
*Went, drr  die Mutter vor~  den1 Bolzen liisen  willst, nlusst  du ihn/lHN fesrhulren  und sie/SIE  nuch 
rechrs drehen. quantification  as  in  (34)(a)/(b).I3~he  domain  of  quantification  is  given  by  the 
deaccented indefinite, which forces us to assume that deaccented indefinites may pick  . - 
up existing referents and "requantify"  over them. 
(34)  a.  A freshman usually wears a BASEBALL cap. 
('most freshmen wear a baseball cap') 
b.  A FRESHMAN usually wears a baseball cap. 
('most wearers of baseball caps are freshmen') 
Krifka's  non-novel  indefinites  suggests  that  deaccenting  goes  with  specificity. 
However,  the  indefinite  in  (35)(a),  though  deaccented,  is  clearly  non-specific 
introducing  a  novel  referent.14  Deaccenting  in  (35)(a)  appears  to  be  due  to  the 
presupposition induced by only, i.e. that Sue owns a motor cycle. But if  the indefinite is 
substituted for by a non-given definite, the accent is still there although the definite is 
also part of the presupposition of only, cf. (35)(b). 
(35)  a.  Only SUE owns a motor cycle. 
b.  (... Yesterday, the Dutch group visited the faculty) 
But only SUE met the DEAN. 
Apparently,  the  accent-novelty  correspondence  observed  for  definite  descriptions 
doesn't carry over to pronouns and indefinites, thus confirming their position at either 
end of the definiteness scale. 
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